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THE PULL OF THE MAINSTREAM
Martti Koskenniemi *
HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY
LAW. By Theodor Meron. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1989. Pp. xi,

263. $55.
I

Ever since the Grotian tradition became little more than an object
of ritualistic invocation in keynote speeches at conferences of learned
societies, international lawyers have had difficulty accounting for rules
of international law that do not emanate from the consent of the states
against which they are applied. In fact, most modem lawyers have
assumed that international law is not really binding unless it can be
traced to an agreement or some other meeting of wills between two or
more sovereign states. Once the idea of a natural law is discarded, it
seems difficult to justify an obligation that is not voluntarily assumed.
Simultaneously, however, it has been evident that if international
law consisted only of formalized meetings of will called treaties, it·
would not seem very important. Nor would it then contain many of
those norms that most lawyers believe are crucial for the functioning
of the present international system (such as sovereignty, nonintervention, etc.). A thoughtful commentator once noted: "[O]ne can have a
very fair idea of international law without having read a single treaty:
and ... one cannot gain any very coherent idea of the essence of international law by reading treaties alone." 1
The matter is particularly important in regard to norms intended
to safeguard basic human rights and fundamental freedoms. If the
only states bound to respect such rights and freedoms are the states
that have formally become parties to the relevant instruments - and
even then only within the scope of their often compromised wordings
and multiple reservations - then many important political values
would seem to lack adequate protection. It is inherently difficult to
accept the notion that states are legally bound not to engage in genocide, for example, only if they have ratified and not formally denounced the 1948 Genocide Convention. Some norms seem so basic,
so important, that it is more than slightly artificial to argue that states
are legally bound to comply with them simply because there exists an

* Counsellor Qegal affairs), Permanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations, and member of the Finnish Foreign Service since 1979. Diploma in Law 1983, Oxford University; Doctor
of Laws 1989, Turku University, Finland. - Ed.
1. C. PARRY, THE SOURCES AND EVIDENCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 35 (1965).
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agreement between them to that effect, rather than because, in the
words of the International Court of Justice (!CJ), noncompliance
would "shock[ ] the conscience of mankind" 2 and be contrary to "elementary considerations of humanity." 3
Professor Theodor Meron's book, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law, places itself squarely within this problem: To what extent are states bound by humanitarian or human
rights norms regardless of treaties, by way of customary law? The
subject, an important one, is situated in a theoretical mine field.
Although it seems clear that not all international law can be based
upon agreement, it seems much less clear what else, then, it may be
founded upon. Basic questions arise about the legitimacy of applying
norms that are based on something other than voluntarily concluded
agreements. A Grotian lawyer would not, of course, perceive a great
difficulty. He would simply say that some norms exist by force of natural reason or social necessity. Such an argument, however, is not
open to a modern lawyer or court, much less an international court,
established for the settlement of disputes between varying cultures, varying traditions, and varying conceptions of reason and justice. Such
conceptions seem to be historically and contextually conditioned, so
that imposing them on a nonconsenting state seems both political and
unjustifiable as such.
It is, I believe, for this reason - the difficulty of justifying conceptions of natural justice in modern society - that lawyers have tended
to relegate into "custom" all those important norms that cannot be
supported by treaties. In this way, they might avoid arguing from an
essentially naturalistic -and thus suspect - position. "Custom" may
seem both less difficult to verify and more justifiable to apply than
abstract maxims of international justice.
Besides treaty and custom, the Statute of the ICJ in paragraph 1 of
article 38 (the provision usually held to contain the authoritative statement of the sources of international law) also lists the "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" as well as, in a secondary
fashion, teachings of publicists and judicial precedent. 4 At first blush,
2. Reservations to the Convention on the Preservation and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (Advisory Opinion of May 28).
3. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9).
4. Paragraph 1 of article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice states:
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting States;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38, para. 1.
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the category of "general principles" would seem a suitable candidate
for arguing about human rights or principles of humanitarian law.
But the ICJ, for one, seems never to have made express reference to
general principles. For most modern lawyers, and the World Court,
international law consists, for all practical purposes, of only two sorts
of norms: treaty norms and custom. All nonwritten norms whatever their basis, character, or significance - are routinely treated
as customary. As a result, as a judge at the ICJ has noted, much of
what we tend to call custom "is not only not customary law: it does
not even faintly resemble a customary law." 5
Professor Meron follows this strategy. Although he accepts the
category of "general principles" as a valid way to argue about human
rights and humanitarian norms, he does not use this argumentative
tack. Nor does he examine whether, or to what extent, such norms
might be valid as natural law. His reason for so doing is clearly stated:
he wishes to "utilize irreproachable legal methods" to enhance "the
credibility of the norms'' for which he argues (pp. 81, 246). The assumption here is that to argue in terms of general principles or natural
justice is to engage in a political debate and to fall victim to bias and
subjectivism. Following his rationalistic credo, Meron hopes to base
human rights and humanitarian norms on something more tangible,
something that jurists can look at through a distinct {objective, scientific) method and thus ground their conclusions in a more acceptable
way - a way that would also better justify their application against
nonconsenting states.
The starting point - hoping to argue nontreaty-based human
rights and humanitarian norms as custom - however, does not fare
too well in Professor Meron's careful analysis of pertinent case law
and juristic opinion. He accepts the orthodox "two-element theory"
of custom (i.e., for custom to exist, there must be both material practice to that effect and the practice must have been motivated by a belief
that it is required by law (p. 3)), yet case law contains little to actually
support such a theory, although passages paying lip service to it are
abundant. Thus, his analysis of the judgement by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case, 6 in which the Court inquired, inter a/ia, whether articles 1
and 3 common to all four of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 had
"crystallized into" custom, concludes by noting the Court's "complete
failure to inquire whether opinio juris and practice support the crystallization of articles 1 and 3 into customary law" (p. 36).
Meron's unwillingness to inquire into a nonwritten law which
might not be "custom" in the sense of the two-element theory is sur5. Jennings, The Identification of International
AND PRACTICE 3, 5 (B. Cheng ed. 1982).

Law, in

INTERNATIONAL LAW, TEACHING

6. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
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prising. The results of his analysis of the pertinent ICJ practice would
seem to compel him to abandon or at least completely revise the traditional view of custom. Should "custom" perhaps be thought of in
terms of some deeper historical necessity, for example, as many nineteenth-century international jurists argued? 7 But no such radical revision is proposed. Meron's analysis complies with the orthodox
approach - however much Meron is led to conclude that legal practice does not support it.
It often seems that Meron's analysis and criticism of the ICJ's
method for "finding" customary law leaves little ground for Meron
himself to stand on. Sometimes Meron not_es that his own "preferred
indicators" for determining when a human rights norm is to be valid
as custom would be whether it is repeated in instruments and confirmed in national practice (in particular, in national laws) (pp. 93-94).
Yet, there is no study of national laws in the book. In another place,
Professor Meron stresses that "Opinio Juris is thus critical for the
transformation of treaties into general law" (p. 53; footnote omitted),
although he does not explain how courts might ascertain the presence
of this "subjective element" without making presumptions on the basis
of material practice. Yet, he also holds that the ICJ has made "only
perfunctory and conclusory references to the practice of states" (p. 42)
and he argues that only "limited significance" is given to the two elements and that the burden of proof for establishing custom in the
human rights field is lighter than usual (p. 113). Sometimes he throws
the orthodox theory completely overboard by concluding that, for important human rights norms, "[t]he 'ought' merges with the 'is' " (p.
42); that the "derivation of specific rules from general principles ... is
an important process in the development of customary humanitarian
law" (p. 68); and that "the central source for the rules [for internal
armed conflicts] will be the principles of humanity" (p. 74).
These results are clearly correct. And yet, they are also threatening by focusing attention away from "rigorous" tests of pedigree to
uncertain and controversial moral principles. It is somewhat disappointing that so much analysis seemed necessary when the conclusion
would have been available from a number of important studies on the
practice of the ICJ and its predecessor. 8 It appears to be the case that
the Court has "instituted a system of decision-making in which the
legal conclusion reached is determined by the application of rules of
7. See, e.g.,
ANA 1 (1923).

Vinogradoff, Historical Types of International Law, in

1 BIBLIOTHECA VISSERI-

c.

8. See, e.g.,
JENKS, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 264 (1964); M.
S0RENSEN, LES SOURCES DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 108-11 (1946); Haggenmacher, La doc-

trine des deux elements du droit coutumier dans la pratique de la cour intemationale, 90 REVUE
GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 5 (1986); Virally, The Sources of International
Law, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 116, 133-35 (M. Seirensen ed. 1968). .
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law largely treated as self-evident." 9 Meron's book would have been a
more important contribution to human rights law if, instead of arriving where most thoughtful scholars have arrived on the subject for the
past forty years, it had attempted an analysis of what makes a norm
binding even absent a basis in treaty, if not the practice and the opinio.
But there is no analysis of the political right in the book, no "derivations" from general principles or from principles of humanity, and no
attempt to take the Court's departures from orthodox custom
seriously.
Although Meron does not analyze the various general theories of
international custom (and no such analysis is really needed), he does
review the arguments used by lawyers seeking to make treaty-based
human rights norms binding on nonparties. The four principal argumentative strategies claim that a norm is binding for nonparties if (1)
it can be deduced from the provisions - in particular articles 55 and
56 - of the United Nations Charter; (2) it is supported by a general
(even if perhaps not unanimous) consensus; (3) it has become a "general principle of law" in the sense of article 38 of the Statute of the
ICJ; or (4) it has been tacitly accepted by nonparties as well (pp. 81106). Of these, Meron concentrates on the last two, which he thinks
are the most likely to succeed.
The category of "general principles," it must be noted at the outset, does not signify for Professor Meron what is signified to the drafters of the ICJ Statute - particularly Baron Descamps. 10 General
principles are not natural or even quasi-natural principles but generalizations from municipal jurisprudence (pp. 88-89). But one wonders
whether this is really the secret of their apparent relevance. Given
that it is practically impossible to collect representative data of such
jurisprudence, and given that only a minority of countries apply a
stare decisis system, the usefulness of this approach seems doubtful.
For a continental lawyer - such as this author - using basically
American and British cases to argue for general principles is a questionable strategy. It is true that analyzing American cases - as
Meron has done - is a useful tool for illustrating the structure of
typical argumentation in human rights as in other cases. But I would
be very hesitant to imply that the arguments by U.S. courts in, for
instance, the much-debated Filartiga v. Pena-Ira/a 11 and Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic 12 cases possess any formal authority in determining the obligations of other states. Perhaps this is not what Meron
9. Kearney, Sources ofLaw and the International Court ofJustice, in 2 THE FUTURE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CoURT OF JUSTICE 610, 653 (L. Gross ed. 1976).
10. See ADVISORY CoMMITTEE OF JURISTS, PROCEs-VERBAUX OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF
THE COMMITTEE 293 (1920).
11. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
12. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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implies. Maybe he merely intends to show the typical (natural!) way
in which the relevant norms (prohibition of torture and terrorism) are
applicable. But, in that case, he should have considered those arguments on their merits, not merely described their use in U.S. courts.
Yet the book contains no such discussion. One is left with the feeling
that Meron's very discussion - informative though it is - is more
intended to show American lawyers how to plead when pressing a
human rights case in American courts than to reveal much about international law.
The other strategy recommended by Meron as an "effective means
for expanding the universality of international human rights" (p. 89)
- arguing on the basis of tacit acceptance ("acquiescence") - is a
strategy much used in intemational litigation. 13 Using it for the purposes he intends, however, meets with the difficulties any consensualism is bound to confront. First, it contains the unpleasant implication
that people have human rights only so far as actually accepted by
states. It thus leaves the door open for a state to come up with evidence actually denying its intent to be bound by others' treaties. Second, and relating to the first point, it meets with difficulties of proof.
If a state denies that it has consented to a human rights norm embedded in a treaty to which it has refrained from being a party, how can
we justifiably claim to know which norms that state has consented to
better than the state itself does? The very assumption that we could
seems odd. It provides a justification for overruling a state's express
report about its will - in this sense it is a Hobbesian argument which
posits the arguer in the place of Leviathan. It also destroys the liberal
justification for relying on consent - and the justification for basing
social order on a popular vote - in the first place: Why do this if
someone else (we) can know better?
In fact, arguing from tacit consent tends to be a camouflage for
arguing from a conception of justice, most frequently from the principle that legitimate expectations should not be ignored. It is not really
- despite appearances - a consensual argument at all. 14 This is the
lesson of the judgment by the ICJ in the Nuclear Tests cases, 15 in
which the court held France bound by certain statements made by its
president and foreign minister despite other evidence that France
never intended to assume a legally enforceable obligation. This result,
however, is not a conclusion about someone's consent, but an extrapolation of what seems just or, as the Court here put it, in accordance
13. Cf M. KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 284-341 (1989).
14. Cf c. PATEMAN, THE PROBLEM OF PoLmCAL OBLIGATION: A CRmQUE OF LIBERAL
THEORY 15-17, 81-98 (2d ed. 1985).
15. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457 {Dec. 20); Nuclear Tests (Aus. v. Fr.), 1974
I.C.J. 253 (Dec. 20).
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with the good faith principle. 16 Therefore, it is hardly consistent with
the orthodox theory of customary law, nor, for that matter, with the
assumptions of legal objectivity behind liberal legal theory.
Throughout the book one has the impression that whenever Meron
states that some humanitarian or human rights principle is a part of
customary law, the conclusion does not really follow from the arguments, but instead existed in Meron's head even as the arguments were
chosen. This feeling is in no way diminished by the fact that he continually changes the types of arguments he puts forward to support his
conclusions. Sometimes he relies quite openly on a shared intuition
between the reader and himself. The feeling is, in other words, that
Professor Meron has quite strong opinions about which norms should
be included among those that are binding even beyond specific treaties, 17 and that he uses whichever arguments are available to support
them.
This is intended less as a criticism than a point of reflection. Might
it not be that the certainty we have of the illegality of genocide, or of
torture, or of depriving ethnic wholes the right of self-determination, is
by itself sufficient reason to include those norms in international law?
What does it add to such certainty if we find, or do not find, a precedent, a state, or the United Nations General Assembly, saying the
same? Very little, I feel.
My point is as follows: In his wish to look for "irreproachable
legal methods" to argue for the validity of nontreaty norms, Professor
Meron has tried to rely on the traditional two-element theory of custom - the material practice and the opinio juris. His hope was that
these would provide a noncontroversial litmus test that would finally
convince everyone of the certainty of his conclusions. As Meron himself shows, however, this test is in fact relatively useless. It is useless,
first, because the interpretation of "state behavior" or "state will" is
not an automatic operation but involves the choice and use of conceptual matrices that are controversial and that usually allow one to argue
either way. But it is also, and more fundamentally, useless because we
do not wish to condone anything that states may do or say, and because it is really our certainty that genocide or torture is illegal that
allows us to understand state behavior and to accept or reject its legal
message, not state behavior itself that allows us to understand that
these practices are prohibited by law. It seems to me that if we are
uncertain of the latter fact, then there is really little in this world we
can feel confident about.
16. Nuclear Tests (Aus. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. at 268.
17. Meron's list includes the prohibition of torture and racial discrimination, and the minimum guarantees for humane treatment found in article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. See pp. 4647 (his list of customary standards in Geneva Convention No. IV); pp. 94-98 (his list of general
human rights norms).
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In other words, finding juristic evidence (a precedent, a habitual
behavior, a legal doctrine) to support such a conclusion adds little or
nothing to our reasons for adopting it. To the contrary, it contains the
harmful implication that it is only because this evidence is available
that we can justifiably reach our conclusion. It opens the door for
disputing the conclusion by disputing the presence of the evidence, or
for requiring the same evidence in support of some other equally compelling conclusion, when that evidence might not be so readily
available.
It is, of course, true that people are uncertain about right and
wrong. The past two hundred years since the Enlightenment and the
victory of the principle of arbitrary value have done nothing to teach
us about how to know these things or how to cope with our strong
moral intuitions. 18 But one should not pretend that this uncertainty
will vanish if only one is methodologically "rigorous." If the development of the human sciences has taught us anything during its short
history, it is that the effort to replace our loss of faith in theories about
the right and the good with an absolute faith in our ability to understand human life as a matter of social "facts" has been a failure. We
remain just as unable to derive norms from the facts of state behavior
as Hume was. And we are just as compelled to admit that everything
we know about norms which are embedded in such behavior is conditioned by an anterior - though at least in some respects largely
shared - criterion of what is right and good for human life.
II
There is little else to be said about Professor Meron's discussion in
Parts I and II of the book dealing with the customary law character of
humanitarian and human rights norms. The discussion is balanced
and the conclusions are usually intuitively acceptable. They are not
so, however, because Meron succeeds in showing how well they correspond to state practice, but because they, for the most part, appear
reasonable and coincide with our moral imagination. For example, he
discusses at length whether a provision in a treaty allowing reservations - or not allowing them - is relevant in determining the customary character of that provision. Meron concludes, correctly, that
these facts may have some probative value although they remain unreliable as rules for determining whether the respective provision might
be valid as custom (p. 24). The point I want to make here is that the
contextual assessment that ascertains the customary character of a
provision cannot be fitted within any rigid "method" for finding custom in every case. It is a practical matter (in the sense of being related
to normative praxis) that requires making contested, political evalua18. Cf. A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY OF MORAL THEORY (2d ed. 1984).
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tions. It is not a rule-determined activity but one which gives meaning
to rules (namely rules concerning reservations, consent, and jus
cogens) and which therefore remains external to them.
Meron also discusses the transformation of treaties into custom
with particular reference to norms enshrined in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols. He considers, for example, whether practice by treaty parties constitutes relevant "practice,"
the effect of occasional deviations and possible reactions to them, and
the scope of the relevant practice by nonparties. But his framing of
the problem is notoriously problematic. A treaty may be evidence of
custom (in the sense that it shows the importance of a norm to its
parties) or evidence of the absence of custom (otherwise we must remain puzzled about the need to conclude the treaty in the first
place).1 9 Professor Meron is aware of these - and other - paradoxes, but his discussion does little more than lay them in the open.
At a significant place in his argument, he contends that "[b]oth scholarly and judicial sources have shown reluctance to reject conventional
norms whose content merits customary law status as candidates for
that status . . . " (p. 57). This, he adds, "may reflect the strength of
moral claims" for their application (p. 57). Again, this seems quite
correct but is simultaneously puzzling if one remembers Meron's insistence on the "two-element" method. Again, one seems drawn into a
contextual assessment of the political significance of the treaty.
Consider, for example Professor Meron's account of how the
United States determined which of the rules in Protocol I to the Geneva Convention (which the United States has not ratified) had customary law character. The determination, it seems, was "guided both
by considerations of [the United States'] own military interests and by
policy and value judgments" (p. 68). Meron should take this as an
affirmation that such factors do indeed play a role in this determination, yet he does not. At least he should list this finding among the
state practices he uses to draw consequences from.

III
Lawyers - and international lawyers are no exception - often
assume that the core of law consists of norms enforced by sanctions.
There may even be some doubt about whether norms alone, without
some regime for enforcing them, can properly be called legal norms at
all. As is well known, this point is frequently asserted to deny the
19. Thus, in Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 20 INTL.
LEGAL MATERIALS 1, 72-73 (1981), the Arbitrator regarded lump sum agreements whereby less
than full compensation was paid as evidence of custom which did not provide for full compensation in nationalization cases. However, lump sum agreements were treated as conscious departures from a customary standard offull compensation by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
in Sedco, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 25 INTL. LEGAL MATERIALS 629, 633 (1986).
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"legal" character of intersovereign law. 20
If international lawyers have had some trouble convincing critics
about the legal character of their law in the absence of effective sanctions, they have experienced even more difficulty when arguing for the
"hard law" character of international human rights norms. Therefore,
the third, and longest, part of Professor Meron's book - discussing
the international responsibility of states for violations of human rights
standards - seems of paramount importance for human rights lawyers (pp. 136-245). If human rights are really connected with a regime
of international accountability, then they might emerge from their association with "soft" ethico-political principles onto the level of hard
law.
This part of Meron's book is divided into eleven sections, which
deal with most of what are usually thought of as central issues in the
international law of responsibility. Professor Meron discusses, inter
alia, problems relating to attribution of responsibility (private acts/
state responsibility), the application of the domestic remedies rule with
respect to citizens and foreigners, the relevance of the problematic distinction between obligations of conduct and of result, the usefulness of
the notion of obligations erga omnes, the distinction between international crimes and delicts, exceptions to the responsibility rule (state of
necessity), and modalities for realizing responsibility (national vs. international enforcement).
Here, too, the discussion is balanced and methodologically "rigorous" and one finds little substantive disagreement with Meron's conclusions. He argues that international human rights norms are hard
law, just as any other international norms, being connected with an
identical accountability regime. The main problem here relates to
Meron's admission that "[d]ue to the scarcity of practice ... our discussion will frequently be largely theoretical" (p. 137). This admission
detracts somewhat from Meron's wish to show that human rights
norms are "hard law," enforceable- and actually enforced- by national and international courts and mechanisms. To speak of a regime
may even seem somewhat grandiose in view of the virtual absence of
relevant practice outside of specific treaties, such as the European
Convention on Human Rights (1950) and its American counterpart
(1970) as well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (1966). As Meron notes, a general regime exists nowhere apart
from the drafts and reports of the International Law Commission, the
United Nation's main body for the codification and progressive development of international law. These drafts and reports are not classifiable as custom by any classical test, yet, according to Meron, they still
"give a useful indication of customary law" (p. 137). For all practical
20. See, e.g.• F. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 173 (1950).
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purposes, his discussion uses those materials as if they contained an
authoritative statement of custom.
The International Law Commission (ILC) has discussed international responsibility for most of its forty-three-year existence. Its current project, begun in 1969, contains a repository of valuable materials
on the matter. These materials can - and should - be used in any
discussion concerning the law of responsibility. But the fact that the
materials are only drafts and reports, that the project itself is far from
finished, and that it is the subject of much academic as well as diplomatic controversy shows that one is moving here among a host of
uncertainties.
This may explain why much, if not most, of Meron's discussion
not dealing with the views of the ILC on particular matters concentrates on the application of human rights treaties by organs established
in them. The lengthy, handbook-like section on "mapping recourse
options" for addressing breaches (pp. 136-54) is almost exhaustively
concerned with treaty-based remedies. These remedies are, of course,
generally inapplicable to breaches of customary norms (unless the customary norm is included or interpreted into the respective instrument). In any case, the jurisdiction of the treaty bodies is based on the
acceptance of their jurisdiction by the parties. Nevertheless, and despite any doctrinal problems this may involve, the practice of these
bodies does have relevance for the interpretation and application of
general human rights norms as well. To this extent, Professor
Meron's approach seems justified. One would, perhaps, have only
hoped for a discussion of the basis on which such generalizations are
made - particularly in view of the recognized under-utilization of the
treaty mechanisms for state complaints, which seems to indicate that
pleading human rights cases is not "business as usual" among states.
Outside the practice of the European Convention, there are no
cases in which a state has filed a complaint within a supervisory body
under the relevant provisions of the political covenant, the racial discrimination convention (1966), or the torture convention (1984). The
complete nonuse of the state complaint procedure in these treaties,
and the virtually complete absence of practice concerning international accountability for human rights violations does make it problematic to argue that such accountability exists as matter of customary
law - unless, of course, "custom" is understood as a modern code
word for something politically compelling.
Meron's discussion of imputability follows closely the work of the
ILC in this field. He accepts the Commission's conclusion that both
authorized as well as unauthorized acts by state organs create responsibility (pp. 156-59). Though this is clearly correct as a matter of policy (it being otherwise virtually impossible to establish responsibility),
it is doubtful whether many states will accept this conclusion - par-
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ticularly because he also concludes that states are directly responsible
for acts of even minor officials (pp. 158-60). The latter point is affirmed by a large jurisprudence concerning acquiescence or estoppel,
for instance, in which the acts, statements, or silence by minor officials
have sufficed to bind the state. 21 Indeed, were this otherwise, many of
those whose rights are constantly violated by officials in the regular
police force, for instance, would have no remedy. The combined conclusion - that states are responsible even for nonauthorized acts of
minor officials - though evidently tempered by the exhaustion-of-local-remedies rule is perhaps inevitable if one wishes to have an effective accountability system for violations of human rights. Still, one
wonders whether such a principle can in any near future become anything close to effective reality.
Meron shares the classical view that responsibility in relation to
acts of private persons is connected to the state's duty of care (due
diligence) (p. 171). Responsibility is triggered if the state failed to take
preventive measures. What such measures might be is determined by
a "reasonable person" standard and necessarily varies from case to
case and probably also from country to country. 22 That there is something of a double standard favoring economically worse-off countries seems today quite clear. 23 The broad standard set down by the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights in the Veldsquez-Rodrfguez case24
is probably close to the customary one, as noted by Meron. However,
it is uncertain to what extent the jurisprudence of the European Court
can be argued to support a customary standard. Here the European
Court has repeatedly noted that states that are parties to the European
Convention must legislate to give effect to its provisions. It does not
seem possible to draw the analogy that states should also legislate to
give effect to the uncertain and varying customary standard of due
diligence.
One might be prompted to ask, however, whether "due diligence"
is a proper concept within which to grasp the evolving law of state
responsibility at all. It bears a relationship to fault liability which is
today widely criticized. The construction of the due care standard
may often take place with little or no concern to whether state organs
actually knew about a violation or had any chance of preventing it.
21. See, e.g., Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), 1962 l.C.J. 6, 25 (June 15);
Cahier, Le comportement des etats comme source de droits et d'obligations, in RECUEIL D'
ETUDES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL EN HOMMAGE A PAUL GUGGENHEIM 237 (1968).
22. Cf Affaire des biens Britanniques_au Maroc Espagnol, (U.K. v. Spain), 2 R. Intl. Arb.
Awards 615, 644 (1925).
23. See, e.g., Fitzmaurice, The Future of Public International Law and of the International
Legal System in the Circumstances of Today in LIVRE DU CENTENAIRE 1873-1973: EVOLUTION
ET PERSPECTIVES DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 198, 232 (1973); G. DE LACHARRIERE, LA POLlTIQUE JURIDIQUE EXTERIEURE 63 (1983).
24. Velasquez Rodriguez Case, 28 INTL. LEGAL MATERIALS 291 (Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, July 29, 1988) (1989).
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The presumption of knowledge, based on territorial control - as constructed by the ICJ in the Corfu Channel case, 25 for example - comes
very close to an objective responsibility which is triggered by many
considerations, among which subjective "fault" in some agent may be
only a minor concern. As is clear to anyone having read the statements by state representatives at the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly when it undertakes its annual discussion of the ILC
topic "Liability for Injurious Consequences of Acts not Prohibited by
International Law" - a topic introduced in 1980 and discussed each
autumn since - no-fault liability (notwithstanding terminology and
the somewhat painful attempts to distinguish between "liability" and
"responsibility" in international law) has never come close to receiving
the consent of states. But consent, too, may be a relatively minor matter here.
In fact, Meron comes close to adopting this view in his discussion
of the relationship of "obligations of means" and "obligations of result" (pp. 182-88). He concludes that most human rights obligations
are, or can be conceived of as, obligations of result (pp. 184, 188).
Clearly, for the reality of those obligations, this is the only acceptable
conclusion - though many would not accept it. 26 But it also brings in
a nonfault-related standard and it renders largely superfluous any inquiry into whether anyone has acted with due diligence. It may be in
order not to impose a pure no-fault standard on states that Meron still
contends that "[o]bligations of means and obligations of result do not
compete with, but complement, one another" (p. 184). Such a "combination" might leave it open to argue in terms of due diligence after
all, and thus escape from the consequence, so hard to accept by states,
that they might be responsible for some act or event which they had
no practical means of preventing.
There is virtually no discussion of the customary status or responsibility attached to economic, social, and cultural rights in the book.
While one can appreciate the difficulties that such a discussion would
create, reference to the problem might still have been appropriate, at
least in the present context. It seems that a state's obligations relating
to economic, social, and cultural rights - whatever their basis - cannot easily be construed in terms of obligations of result. As often observed, these rights are "programmatory" in some way that is difficult
to define precisely but which clearly implies that the state has an obligation to act, instead of an obligation to achieve a result.
The discussion concerning the highly problematic conceptions of
norms erga omnes brings in very little that would alleviate the intuitive
feeling that what is at issue here is simply a political evaluation of the
importance of some norms (or compliance with them) vis-a-vis others.
25. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 18-22 (Apr. 9).
26. See, e.g., P. REUTER, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 37 (5th ed. 1976).
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(The same can be said of any attempt to distinguish between international crimes and other, "ordinary" offenses.) As Meron correctly
notes (p. 210), the distinction, as it appears in ILC drafts, is based on
the (naturalistic) assumption that such crimes could be distinguished
by their content. This leaves us with very little in the event of inevitable disagreement about such content. Making a preference between
two assumptions about the intrinsically heinous character of some act
is inevitably a political choice. It is uncertain whether the results of
that choice, if made, for instance, through a majority decision at the
United Nations, would be very appealing to human rights lawyers.
Meron's discussion of erga omnes norms takes up the (highly inconclusive) practice of the International Court of Justice in this respect. He notes that the Court's distinction in the Barcelona Traction
case, 27 between "basic rights of the human person" and "ordinary"
human rights norms is both "conceptually difficult" and "politically
contentious" (p. 192). Referring to the U.S. Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law 28 as well as to draft article 5 of the Second Part of the
ILC draft on state responsibility (p. 198) (which establishes the law of
human rights as an "objective regime," extending the definition of "injured states" in cases of human rights violations to include all states),
he concludes that all relevant human rights norms should be seen as
norms which are valid erga omnes - i.e., owed not to any particular
state but to the international community as a whole. As a result, he
asserts, such norms should be capable of being invoked by any state
regardless of the usual jurisdictional rule that permits only a state
against which or against whose national a violation has taken place to
appear as plaintiff (pp. 196-99).
It is difficult to imagine another conclusion on this matter that
would be more morally compelling and further removed from the realities of international life than this. It is, to say the least, quite impossible to justify such a view by reference to any international custom - if
by "custom" one means something even remotely connected with an
opinio juris plus generally conforming practice. States simply do not,
in any manner which could be termed "customary," take up violations
of human rights in other countries. Neither has judicial practice in
any way formally overturned the dictum of the ICJ in the South West
Africa cases, according to which locus standi is not constituted by the
fact that all states have an interest in "humanitarian matters." 29
Though Meron does argue that "international practice" supports his
conclusion (p. 199), he does not mention even one incident of state
practice to this effect. The only "practice" he cites is the relevant ILC
27. Barcelona Traction (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4, 32 (Feb. 5).
28. REsrATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 703 (1987).
29. South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa), 1966 I.C.J. 4, 34 (July 18).
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draft. Perhaps for this reason, Meron retreats somewhat from his conclusion by noting that "customary law" is "not yet settled" on
whether the right to take up violations wherever and against whomever they might take place is restricted only to gross and systematic
violations (p. 199). One is left wondering what type of evidence would
go to settle the matter. Two facts seem pertinent. On the one hand,
states do not grant each other the right to complain to judicial bodies
about domestic human rights violations regardless of the nationality of
the victims. On the other hand, they do make political protests every
now and then, and these are made selectively, based on such factors as
political alliances and controversies, inclinations of domestic audiences, and the like.
It would be difficult to accept that states could not criticize or take
up in international organs the plight of people struggling against repeated human rights violations, regardless of considerations of nationality or geography. The practice of UN organs, for example, has
witnessed a marked reduction in the use of the reservation of matters
on "domestic jurisdiction" in article 2(7) of the UN Charter. 30 But it
is one thing to note and applaud this development and another to argue that states have generally the right to ask for judicial determination of the conformity of a practice in some state with a customary
standard of human rights. If there existed consensus about a basic
customary standard, this suggestion would perhaps not seem too objectionable. In view of the extreme variations of political culture, and
economic and technological capacity, however, as well as the range of
plausible interpretations about the content and application of any potential basic standard, my fear is that such actio popularis would simply mean an attempt to enforce judicially a set of Western values. I
have little doubt that strong ethico-political necessities require international lawyers, and others, to condemn oppressive social practices,
wherever they might occur. Such practices should be taken into international fora, discussed there, and hopefully eliminated sooner rather
than later. But I would hesitate to affirm a right of actio popularis,
with all that this implies about the finality and enforcement of the
judgment, the creation of a legal culture of pleading human rights in
other countries, and other issues. Such an attempt at a shortcut to a
world state would too easily become an apology for imperialism.
Similar problems arise in Professor Meron's discussion of the state
of necessity and other causes for departing from the assumed customary standard. On the one hand, there exists some practice under the
political covenant on this matter, but it is doubtful whether this practice may be generalized as customary. On the other hand, any acceptable conclusion should provide for a set of core rights - however they
30. For a detailed analysis, see M. RAJAN, THE EXPANDING JURISDICTION OP THE UNITED
NATIONS (1982); M. RAJAN, UNITED NATIONS AND DOMESTIC JURISDICTION (1958).
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are characterized - from which states may not derogate. What these
latter norms might be raises the issue of jus cogens, a Latin code
phrase for making the political distinction between important and less
important rights. Meron does not discuss the problem of how (i.e., by
what "method") to recognize jus cogens. But the expressions he uses
("categorical rules," "decisive importance of certain norms and values" (pp. 221, 222)) are far removed from any assumption that these
norms might be recognizable by the orthodox twin criterion of custom. The point is that this is a matter of political value: if you and I
believe something is so important t\1at it can in no circumstance be
derogated, then surely this conviction is deeper and more forceful than
any conviction about legal validity created by any formal test, and we
will feel fully justified in enforcing it as law (if that is the sensible way
to enforce it).

IV
Professor Meron's work is a solid piece of writing within the mainstream of international legal scholarship. He has taken up an issue
which has surprisingly long been neglected by publicists, and he arrives at substantively consoling conclusions: Indeed, some human
rights and humanitarian norms may be argued as custom; indeed,
these norms may be linked with a regime of responsibility for violations of the respective rights. The conclusions in each specific problem
area are just as unsurprising in their final vindication of liberal intuitions. Indeed, which rights are customary is less a matter of formal
tests of legal validity than a deference to their ethico-political importance; indeed, "elementary considerations of humanity" and "basic
rights of the human person" receive legal protection regardless of
whether lawyers come up with any number of precedents to support
them; indeed, the more shocking the violation, the more open is the
law for allowing responsibility to be triggered. Would any other conclusion have been acceptable, or possible?
Throughout the book, Professor Meron stresses the importance of
backing his conclusions with "irreproachable legal methods" (p. 81).
He stresses the need for "greater analytical rigour on the part of
human rights lawyers" (p. 247). His concern is, obviously, the relative
exclusion of human rights specialists from the center of international
legal debate - an exclusion grounded in what for the mainstream analytical jurists has appeared to be their uncritical enthusiasm over certain ethico-political principles of doubtful juristic value and their
sloppiness in the face of orthodox rule-identification criteria.3 1
31. A similar concern has been expressed by some political theorists who have wished to
develop a more analytical (le., substantively empty) approach to current international human
rights discourse. Especially relevant is J. DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE (1989).
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Clearly, Meron has succeeded in showing that human rights can be
argued just as technically as maritime delimitation. One may ask,
however, whether this is not in some way a mixed blessing. For it may
be argued that the justifying rhetoric of the mainstream is in disarray:
positivism is no longer credible, naturalism has long been a closed option, and the different policy-science approaches have, if taken seriously, failed to demonstrate what is specifically "legal in them," while
their popular versions appear to be thinly disguised rhetoric aimed at
furthering political interests. By becoming more mainstream, human
rights lawyers may gain in academic or diplomatic prestige. But they
will also face the danger of losing their critical teeth and finding themselves discussing analytic distinctions whose one social function is the
legitimation of oppressive practices through the strategy of the exception: once you define a right, you delimit it. And once you delimit it,
you offer a formally valid argument for someone to deny that right.
Here is a final paradox: late-modern legal, social, and linguistic
theory has taught us that rules, whether extracted from behavior or
texts, are of necessity indeterminate. Thinking of human rights in
terms of legal rules will extend indeterminacy into those rights as well.
The secularization of human rights rhetoric involved in its becoming
mainstream, then, may not be the best way to protect human rights.
By remaining in the periphery, in the field of largely subconscious,
private, moral-religious experience that defies technical articulation,
human rights may be more able to retain their constraining hold on
the way most people, and by extension most states, behave.

